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The Reaction of the City of London to the Quebec 
Resolutions, 1864-1866
ANDREW SMITH
Abstract
This paper examines how British investors reacted when the Quebec Resolutions 
were published in the fall of 1864. Although the responses of bond markets are 
briefly considered, the paper is mainly based on non-quantitative sources such 
as newspaper editorials and correspondence. Examining why British inves-
tors generally approved of the constitutional plan contained in the Quebec 
Resolutions is useful because it illuminates such important themes as the 
place of imported capital in Canadian state formation, the role of Britain in 
Confederation, and the viability of interest-group explanations for the making 
of colonial policy. The ideas of British investors are also important because 
British capital helped to finance the public works that were a sine qua non of 
Confederation. In 1866, Joseph Howe identified pressure from the bondhold-
ers of unprofitable Canadian railways as one of the major factors driving the 
British government’s support of Confederation. Although Tom Naylor and 
other historians have made use of Howe’s insight, the role of the investors 
has been ignored by both Ged Martin and by those scholars who advance an 
ideological-origins explanation of Confederation. This paper will help remedy 
this oversight and is a step towards a viable materialist interpretation of why 
Confederation happened in the 1860s.
Résumé
Cet article examine comment les investisseurs britanniques ont réagi au 
moment de la publication des résolutions de la Conférence de Québec à 
l’automne de 1864. Les réactions des marchés des obligations sont considérées 
brièvement, mais le texte se base principalement sur des sources non quanti-
tatives telles que les éditoriaux des journaux et la correspondance. L’étude 
des raisons qui amènent les investisseurs britanniques à approuver, de façon 
générale, le plan constitutionnel compris dans les résolutions s’avère utile. En 
effet, elle fait la lumière sur des thèmes importants comme la place des capitaux 
étrangers dans la création de l’État canadien, le rôle de la Grande-Bretagne 
dans la Confédération et la viabilité des arguments des groupes d’intérêt en ce 
1
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2006 REVUE DE LA SHC
New Series, Vol. 17, no. 1/Nouvelle série, vol. 17, no 1
qui a trait à l’élaboration d’une politique coloniale. L’opinion des investisseurs 
britanniques revêt aussi son importance, car les capitaux britanniques aident 
à financer des travaux publics, condition indispensable à la Confédération. 
En 1866, Joseph Howe observe que la pression exercée par les détenteurs 
d’obligations déficitaires de chemins de fer canadiens constitue une des prin-
cipales causes de l’appui du gouvernement britannique à la Confédération. 
Même si Tom Naylor et d’autres historiens ont tiré profit des éclaircissements 
de Howe, Ged Martin, de même que les universitaires qui prônent la thèse des 
origines idéologiques de la Confédération, ont ignoré le rôle des investisseurs. 
Cet article aide à remédier à cet oubli et représente un pas vers une interpré-
tation matérialiste viable de l’avènement de la Confédération dans les années 
1960.
Money may not make the world go around, but investment had a great deal to do with Confederation. This paper examines how British inves-
tors reacted when a draft constitution for a British North American federation 
appeared in November 1864 in the form of the Quebec Resolutions. Although 
the responses of bond markets are briefly considered, this paper is mainly 
based on non-quantitative sources: fluctuations in the yields on colonial 
government bonds suggest that investors had a preference for colonial federa-
tion, but understanding why investors thought Confederation was a good idea 
involves looking at the interpretations of the Resolutions that appeared in their 
correspondence and in the British business press. These sources suggest that 
the investors supported Confederation because they believed it would facilitate 
particular types of state intervention in the economy. Moreover, they sensed 
that the creation of a larger political unit would limit the influence of mass 
opinion in colonial law-making and would thereby prevent the state from inter-
fering with the market in the “wrong” way. Since opponents of Confederation 
frequently characterized British financiers as the driving force behind the 
scheme, we ought to ascertain the actual opinions and actions of the investors, 
a group whose role in Confederation is ignored by most historians. In explain-
ing why some interest groups in Britain supported Confederation while others 
were opposed to key planks of the Confederation settlement, this paper will 
shed new light on the relationship between Britain and its North American 
colonies in the 1860s.
The academic literature on Canadian Confederation is rich, varied, and 
often politically charged. The ideas of the Fathers of Confederation regard-
ing provincial powers are an important focus of scholarly debate, and Paul 
Romney’s reminder that John A. Macdonald’s centralizing aspirations were not 
shared by all of the English-speaking Fathers appears particularly relevant to 
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contemporary politics.1 Several intellectual historians have recently explored 
the deeper ideological aspects of Confederation: Ian McKay’s liberal-order 
thesis provides a particularly important framework for interpreting the creation 
of the Dominion.2 The place of French Canada in Confederation has generated 
its own set of scholarly debates, as have the experiences of Nova Scotia and 
the Maritimes as a whole.3 The fact that our analysis of Confederation is now 
being extended to include other segments of Canadian society, most notably 
women, is an indication that historians of nation-building in Canada are begin-
ning to draw on the findings of social historians in looking at Confederation’s 
many facets.4
The history of trans-Atlantic investment provides yet another lens for 
viewing Confederation. The reactions of British investors to the constitu-
tional blueprint contained in the Quebec Resolutions is worthy of study 
because their ideas illuminate important themes, such as the place of imported 
capital in Canadian state formation and the role of Britain in Confederation.5
 1 Alan C. Cairns, “The Judicial Committee and its Critics,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 4 (1971): 301-45. For the evolution of Canadian federalism after 1867, see Garth 
Stevenson, Ex Uno Plures: Federal Provincial Relations in Canada, 1867-1896 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 3-22; Paul Romney, Getting it Wrong: 
How Canadians Forgot their Past and Imperilled Confederation (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999), 75-108.
 2 Peter J. Smith, “The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 20 (1987): 3-29; Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith, “Liberal-Republicanism: 
The Revisionist Picture of Canada’s Founding,” in Janet Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith, eds., 
Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican? (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 
1-18; Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of 
Canadian History,” Canadian Historical Review 81 (2000): 617-45.
 3 For the literature on Quebec and Confederation, see Marcel Bellavance, Le Québec et la 
Confédération: un choix libre? Le clergé et la constitution de 1867 (Sillery: Septentrion, 
1992); Stephane Kelly, La petite loterie: comment la Couronne a obtenu la collaboration du 
Canada français après 1837 (Montreal: Boréal, 1997); Arthur Silver, The French-Canadian 
Idea of Confederation, 1864-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). Immediate 
reactions to the Quebec Resolutions are discussed in Peter Waite, “The Quebec Resolutions 
and Le Courrier du Canada, 1864-1865,” Canadian Historical Review 40 (1959): 294-303, 
esp. 299. For the Maritimes, see Kenneth G. Pryke, Nova Scotia and Confederation 1864-74
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); J. Murray Beck, Joseph Howe (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982); James A. Roy, Joseph Howe: a Study in 
Achievement and Frustration (Toronto: Macmillan, 1935); Philip Buckner, “The Maritimes 
and Confederation: A Reassessment,” Canadian Historical Review 71 (1990): 1-30.
 4 Carmen Nielson Varty, “The ‘Foundling’ Debates: Where are the mothers in Maritime 
Canada’s Confederation history?” (unpublished paper delivered to the Canadian Historical 
Association, York University, May 2006).
 5 This issue certainly interested contemporaries, for the effect of the Quebec Resolutions on 
the prices of colonial government securities was contested in the parliamentary debates on 
Confederation. See speeches by David L. Macpherson in Parliamentary Debates on the Subject 
of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces (Quebec: Hunter, Rose and Co., 
1865), 10 February 1865, 150; and Benjamin Seymour in Ibid., 15 February 1865, 203.
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British capital helped to create the public works that were a sine qua non of 
Confederation and it is therefore logical to examine the thinking of London 
financiers. Considering the investment links between Britain and its colo-
nies can help to reintegrate political economy into the study of the “British 
World.”6 Moreover, studying investors’ reactions to Confederation speaks to 
the importance of international capital flows in the building of the Canadian 
nation-state, an issue whose contemporary relevance has been established by 
scholars such as Leo Panitch and Kari Levitt.7 Financial and economic themes 
have long been central to the literature on state-formation in Europe and the 
United States.8 Indeed, the necessity of borrowing capital from older countries 
is an important feature of the British North American experience that emerges 
from the research on pre-Confederation state-building by Rosemary Langhout, 
Michael Piva, Douglas McCalla, and Peter Baskerville.9 The author’s aim is to 
extend this analysis to the process of Confederation itself by recognizing the 
significant role played by British capital and capitalists. Examining the opin-
ions of British businessmen with respect to the Quebec Resolutions, the task of 
this paper, is a step towards this goal.
“The City,” as London’s financial district was known, did not have an 
absolute blackball power over legislation, but had a group of politically pow-
erful investors disliked the Quebec Resolutions, it is doubtful whether the 
imperial parliament would have implemented them in the form of the British 
 6 For the concept of the British World, see Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., Canada
and the British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2006).
 7 Leo Panitch, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” Studies in Political 
Economy 6 (1981): 7-33; Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: the Multinational Corporation in 
Canada, 2nd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).
 8 The literature on the economics of state-formation in Britain and the United States includes, 
P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: a Study in the Development of Public 
Credit, 1688-1756 (London: St Martin’s Press, 1967); Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money 
and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000 (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 2001), 172-
74; John Brewer, The Sinews of Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); 
Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” Journal of Economic 
History 49 (1989): 803-32; Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: the Origins of Central 
State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
 9 Rosemary Langhout, “Public Enterprise: an Analysis of Public Finance in the Maritime 
Colonies during the Period of Responsible Government” (Ph.D. diss., University of New 
Brunswick, 1989); Peter Baskerville, “Transportation, Social Change, and State Formation, 
Upper Canada, 1841-1864,” in Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, eds., Colonial Leviathan: State 
Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 
230-56; Michael J. Piva, “Government Finance and the Development of the Canadian State,” 
in Ibid., 257-83; Douglas McCalla, “Railways and the Development of Canada West, 1850-
1870,” in Ibid., 192-229.
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North America Act, 1867. As it happened, the investors responded well to 
the Resolutions. Like most members of Britain’s “political nation” (i.e., the 
enfranchised property classes), the major investors in Canada liked the plan for 
a colonial union because it promised a strong federal government and the pres-
ervation of the colonial political bond. Introduced into the imperial Parliament 
at a time of uncertainty related to the United Kingdom’s own constitutional 
future, the British North America Act reached the statute book in part because it 
enjoyed the support of a large interest group that had a stake in the measure.10
British investors had good reason to care about the political future of 
British North America because the massive inflow of British capital into the 
North American colonies in the years surrounding Confederation was con-
nected to the fact these territories were under British sovereignty. Several 
historians have argued that Empire borrowers received favourable terms in 
London’s capital markets compared to comparable sovereign states and we 
know that the per capita volume of British investment in British North America 
in 1860 was far greater than the amount of British investment in the United 
States.11 When the delegates at the Quebec Conference declared that the 
“present and future prosperity” of the provinces depended on remaining under 
the British Crown, they were recognizing an important politico-economic 
fact.12
 10 That British investors helped to bring about Confederation is the central argument of Andrew 
Smith, “British Businessmen and Canadian Confederation: Gentlemanly Capitalism at Work” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Western Ontario, 2005). The constitutional question that was vex-
ing Britons in 1867 was Parliamentary Reform: the Second Reform Bill was passed in 1867 
after much discussion. It dramatically increased the size of Britain’s electorate. Catherine Hall, 
Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall, Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and 
the British Reform Act of 1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Maurice 
Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: the Passing of the Second Reform Bill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).
 11 The benefits formal Empire brought to British investors are discussed in Niall Ferguson, 
Colossus: the Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 185-7, 279-80. 
By promoting trust and reducing informational asymmetries, Empire membership helped 
to promote investment in a jurisdiction. D.C.M. Platt argues that the experiences of the 
Dominions (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) were essentially different from that of the 
United States in that they were far more reliant on borrowed British capital than the United 
States. D.C.M. Platt, Foreign Finance in Continental Europe and the United States, 1815-
1870: Quantities, Origins, Functions, and Distributions (London: George Allen, 1984), 141. 
Most of the capital used in the United States in this period came from accumulated domestic 
savings rather than from overseas investors: Irving Stone, The Global Export of Capital from 
Great Britain, 1865-1914: A Statistical Survey (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), Tables 1 
and 2. Comparative data regarding the levels of British investment in Canada and the United 
States is provided in Smith, “British Businessmen and Canadian Confederation,” 47-91.
 12 “Quebec Resolutions,” in Joseph Pope, ed., Confederation: Being a Series of Hitherto 
Unpublished Documents Bearing on the British North America Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1895), 
38-52.
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The involvement of financiers in the British government’s decision to sup-
port Confederation is an issue that has been debated since Joseph Howe’s 1866 
declaration that people seeking to salvage certain Canadian securities were press-
ing the imperial government to unite Canada with the more solvent Maritime 
colonies.13 However, we are still far from achieving a consensus among histori-
ans on this question. Ged Martin has dismissed the idea that British support for 
Confederation was the result of pressure from business interests, claiming that 
“historians who habitually emphasise economic factors tend to portray uniden-
tified capitalists whispering in the ears of British ministers in the mid-1860s, 
urging them to create a unified British North America.”14 Martin’s approach to 
Confederation emphasizes high politics and the evolution of an elite consensus 
in Britain. By contrast, other scholars, most notably Tom Naylor, P.J. Cain, and 
A.G. Hopkins, argue that British support for Confederation was dictated by the 
needs of London’s financiers, especially those who had invested in the Grand 
Trunk and Hudson’s Bay Companies.15 Cain and Hopkins also argue that British 
policy with regard to Confederation reflected a broader pattern of sectoral privi-
lege in that the British Empire was generally run to suit the interests of Britain’s 
“gentlemanly capitalist” financiers, at the expense of other sectors of the British 
economy, including manufacturers. Their gentlemanly capitalism thesis sheds 
light on the Anglo-Canadian relationship in this era and is useful in understand-
ing why Little Englander anti-colonial sentiment was especially prominent in 
 13 Joseph Howe, Confederation Considered in Relation to the Interests of the Empire (London: 
E. Stanford, 1866), 23-4. Howe identified two other interest groups in Britain who supported 
Confederation: investors in the Hudson’s Bay Company and anti-colonial manufacturers.
 14 Ged Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 1837-67 (Houndmills, 
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1995), 238. In particular, Martin was referring to Arthur Lower, Colony
to Nation: a History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1946), 316. Martin follows the 
authors of the so-called Centennial Synthesis in downplaying the importance of British busi-
ness influence in Confederation. See W.L. Morton, The Critical Years: the Union of British 
North America, 1857-1873 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964); Donald Creighton, The 
Road to Confederation: the Emergence of Canada, 1863-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964); 
P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1962). Although Donald Creighton addresses the economic importance of British investment 
in Canada, he does not ascertain whether the investors shaped British policy with regard to 
Confederation. See his British North America at Confederation: a Study Prepared for the 
Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 1939).
 15 The Marxist historian Tom Naylor declared that the “Baring Brothers were the true Fathers of 
Confederation.” R.T. Naylor, The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914 (Toronto: Lorimer, 
1975), 27-35. Historians who advanced similar theses included Reginald G. Trotter, Canadian
Federation: its Origins and Achievement, a Study in Nation Building (Toronto: Dent, 1924); 
Arthur Lower, Colony to Nation; Donald Roman,“The Contribution of Imperial Guarantees 
for Colonial Loans to the Consolidation of British North America, 1847-1865” (D.Phil. diss., 
University of Oxford, 1978). See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-
2000, 2nd ed., (New York: Longman, 2002), 135-150 and 264-8.
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Britain’s manufacturing centres. Many of Britain’s manufacturers thought that 
Britain would be better off without the troublesome overseas colonies, but those 
financiers who had investments in Canada believed that strengthening the ties to 
the colonies was worthwhile.16
Examining the evolution of Colonial Office policy towards British North 
America in the early 1860s supports the business influence thesis advanced by 
Cain and Hopkins. In 1858-1859, the Colonial Office was indifferent if not hostile 
to the concept of Canadian Confederation. In July 1862, it issued a crucial despatch 
cordially inviting the North American colonies to consider political unification.17
Coming two years before the Charlottetown Conference, this change in official 
thinking was important because it gave a green light to people in the colonies who 
were interested in proposing a colonial union. This reversal in policy was arguably 
the indirect result of the crisis in British investment in Canada that took place in 
the early 1860s. The economic side-effects of the American Civil War affected 
many British investments in Canada, but the crisis was particularly acute at the 
Grand Trunk, a railway that had absorbed massive amounts of British capital and 
which was rapidly approaching bankruptcy.18 In January 1862, desperate, inves-
tors in the Grand Trunk and other Canadian enterprises formed a lobbying group, 
the British North American Association (BNAA), to promote the construction of 
the long-awaited Halifax-Quebec railway and the political unification of the North 
American colonies.19 Because it included some of the London’s most powerful 
financiers, the BNAA was in an excellent position to influence policy.
The evidence for regarding investor lobbying as an important causal factor 
goes well beyond the remarkable timing of the Colonial Office’s endorsement 
of Confederation. The Duke of Newcastle, who was Colonial Secretary between 
 16 Recently retired Canadian Finance Minister Alexander Galt discovered just how widespread 
Little Englander sentiment was when he visited Manchester in 1862. When he addressed the 
Chamber of Commerce in the great industrial city, Galt was confronted by manufacturers 
who viewed Canada and other colonies as millstones around the neck of England. The Little 
Englanders thought that Britain would be better off if the colonies were to become independent 
states. In particular, the manufacturers objected to British military expenditure on a colony 
that had recently increased its customs duties. Speech of the Hon. A.T. Galt, at the Chamber 
of Commerce, Manchester, September 25, 1862 (London: British North American Association, 
1862); “Mr. Galt, Late Finance Minister of Canada,” Money Market Review (11 October 
1862), 314.
 17 Martin, Britain and Canadian Confederation, 114, 232-5. The despatch was reprinted as 
“Despatch of the Duke of Newcastle to the Earl of Mulgrave, Lieutenant-Governor of Nova 
Scotia, dated 6th July 1862, on the subject of the Confederation of the B.N.A. Provinces” in 
Joseph Pope, ed., Confederation, 303-4.
 18 The plight of the Grand Trunk investors is discussed in Smith, “British Businessmen,” 
92-125, and D.C.M. Platt and Jeremy Adelman, “London Merchant Bankers in the First 
Phase of Heavy Borrowing: the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 18 (1990): 208-27.
 19 See the printed Rules of the British North American Association (London: s.n., 1862).
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1859 and 1864, had a close and long-standing relationship with Edward Watkin, a 
Grand Trunk executive.20 Like many of the other members of the BNAA, Watkin 
was a British MP and a prominent figure in the British railway sector, which was 
then at the height of its political influence at Westminster.21 The bankers with 
the largest stake in the ailing Grand Trunk, Thomas Baring MP and George Carr 
Glyn MP, were also important political figures in Britain and enjoyed consider-
able influence in their respective parties (Conservative and Liberal). Barings’ 
bank was second only to the House of Rothschild in international influence and 
resources. Indeed, its activities at the Congress of Vienna led one French diplo-
mat to quip in 1818 that there were six great powers in Europe: England, France, 
Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Baring Brothers.22 Baring held the Province of 
Canada’s London financial agency jointly with Glyn, who was an equally impres-
sive figure in terms of literal and social capital. Glyn’s bank had taken a leading 
role in building Britain’s railway network and this gave him political connections 
to people in every part of the British Isles.23
In ascertaining the role of British business in Confederation, it is important 
to avoid underestimating the impact of geography on investor knowledge and 
influence. Because the deliberations of the Quebec Conference were sealed, 
albeit imperfectly, from outside observers, even the Colonial Office had limited 
knowledge of the intentions of the constitutional draftsmen and had to rely on 
the semi-accurate reports of the Governor General, Lord Monck.24 On the eve 
 20 The Secretary of State for the Colonies was the cabinet minister with the primary responsibility 
for colonial affairs. See D.M.L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867-1887 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1955), 29-43. The Colonial Secretary generally made decisions in 
consultation with the Colonial Office’s small permanent staff of civil servants. Some aspects 
of colonial policy, however, required the involvement of other government departments or the 
Cabinet as a whole. An example of the latter would include the 1862 vote by the British cabinet 
on whether the British government should underwrite a loan to construct the Halifax-Quebec 
railway. See M.R.D. Foot, ed., The Gladstone Diaries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 6:114, 
10 April 1862. Newcastle’s career as Colonial Secretary is discussed by Edward Watkin, Canada 
and the States: Recollections, 1851 to 1886 (London: Ward, Lock, 1887), 5; Colin C. Eldridge, 
“The Colonial Policy of the 5th Duke of Newcastle, 1859-1964” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Nottingham, 1966); F. Darrell Munsell, The Unfortunate Duke: Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of 
Newcastle, 1811-1864 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), 237-49.
 21 Geoffrey Alderman, The Railway Interest (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1973). 
See also John Neville Greaves, Sir Edward Watkin, 1819-1901: the Last of the Railway Kings
(Lewes: The Book Guild, 2005).
 22 Phillip Ziegler, The Sixth Great Power, Barings, 1762-1829 (London: Collins, 1988), 10.
 23 Roger Fulford, Glyn’s 1753-1953: Six Generations in Lombard Street (London: Macmillan, 
1953), 121; “Glyns and the Grand Trunk Railway,” Three Banks Review 52 (1961): 28-40; R. 
A. Ashbee, “George Carr Glyn and the railways,” Three Banks Review 46 (1960): 34-47.
 24 On 12 October 1864, the correspondent of the Times and several Canadian newspapers asked for per-
mission to publish a daily abstract of the proceedings. However, their request to be released from 
their pledge of secrecy was denied. See Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Sir Charles 
Tupper Fonds, MG26-F 2:474, reel C-3202, the Proceedings of the Quebec Conference.
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of the conference, Monck had predicted to Colonial Secretary Edward Cardwell 
that the delegates would propose a legislative union, an option both men would 
have preferred. Monck’s forecast, however, turned out to be wishful thinking.25
The full details of the Quebec Resolutions were deliberately leaked to a Quebec 
newspaper, Le Courrier du Canada, and were published on 8 November 1864. 
The republication of this report by the London Standard on 24 November pro-
vided British investors with their first look at the hitherto-nebulous particulars 
of the proposed constitution.26
The process by which information about the colonies arrived in London 
is important because the prices of government bonds in the 1860s reflected 
political conditions much as they do today. A high yield on government bonds 
is an indication of political instability: governments pay more to borrow when 
investors believe there is a greater risk of them defaulting. The British state had 
very low borrowing costs because its bonds (called “Consols”) were perceived 
as very safe. Other governments seeking to borrow funds paid a premium over 
Consols that reflected the market’s current assessment of risk. Because markets 
aggregate the interpretations of many individuals, tracking the fluctuations in 
the yields on British North American bonds traded in London provides one way 
of gauging investor reactions to political events. For instance, in the late 1850s, 
a period of relative diplomatic stability, the yield spread between Canadian 
bonds and Consols was typically in the 2 percent range. After 1861, Canada’s 
borrowing costs rose, and the yield spread did not return to the once-customary 
2 percent range until the late 1860s.27 The fact that political events had a major 
impact on borrowing costs illuminates why British financiers would interest 
themselves in the constitutional affairs of a set of distant colonies.
Comparing borrowing costs in different decades or years exposes the 
market’s perceptions of the overall political and economic climate. Tracking 
changes over shorter periods of time (e.g., week to week) reveals how the 
market registered particular events as they became known and provides one 
way of looking at investor responses to particular events. Generally speaking, 
the attractiveness of Canadian government bonds to investors was connected 
 25 LAC, Edward Cardwell Fonds, MG27-1A1, Box 6, reel B-532, Cardwell to Gordon, 12 
November 1864, 14 October 1864. On the official desire for a legislative union, see LAC, 
Colonial Office (hereafter CO), 6/167, Monck to Cardwell, 7 November 1864; Cardwell to 
Monck, 3 December 1864.
 26 Charles Bischoff of the British American Land Company told Galt that the report in the 
Standard was the first regular and complete description of the proposed constitution he had 
seen. See LAC, Galt Fonds, 2:901, Bischoff to Galt, 24 November 1864.
 27 For other uses of this approach, see Marc Weidenmier, “The Market for Confederate Bonds,” 
Explorations in Economic History 37 (2000): 76-97; Bruno S. Frey and Marcel Kucher, “Wars 
and Markets: How Bond Values Reflect the Second World War,” Economica 68 (2001): 317-
33; Ferguson, Cash Nexus, 172-4.
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to Confederation’s prospects of success: the Canadian government’s borrow-
ing costs relative to Consols fell when the Quebec Conference began and 
then increased when an anti-Confederation government was elected in New 
Brunswick in early 1865. The yield spread between Canadian bonds and 
Consols remained above 3 percent as long as the government of Albert J. Smith 
remained in office in New Brunswick. When a pro-Confederation government 
led by Leonard Tilley was returned to power in New Brunswick in 1866, the 
difference in the borrowing costs facing the Canadian and British governments 
narrowed.28 This pattern in the yield spreads suggests that British investors 
had a small but definite preference for Confederation versus the constitutional 
status quo. However, the movements of prices do not explain why investors 
thought Confederation was a good idea. To examine their reasoning, we need 
to turn to non-quantitative sources.
The ideas of an important British investor in Canada are revealed in 
the correspondence between the English businessman Charles Bischoff and 
Alexander Tilloch Galt, a Lower Canadian Father of Confederation, that took 
place in 1864 and 1865. Bischoff was the Chairman of the British American 
Land Company, a London-based company with extensive interests in the 
Eastern Townships, and a founding member of the BNAA. Galt was the com-
pany’s former local manager. Bischoff reported that the Quebec Conference 
had generated widespread interest in London’s financial district and that he 
was “daily applied to” for information by men who were “deeply interested in 
Canadian securities,” and wanted to learn more about the proposed federation. 
 28 Using data from the weekly record of share prices published under the authority of the London 
Stock Exchange, The Course of the Exchange (London: Effingham Wilson, 1860-1869), the 
author calculated the yield spread between Canadian government securities and Bank of 
England Consols between 1 January 1860 and 1 January 1868. Investor perceptions of the 
chances of war between Britain and the United States in this period influenced the British gov-
ernment’s own borrowing costs. This helps to isolate the impact of events within British North 
America from the general diplomatic and military situation, such as the Confederacy’s military 
reversals in the fall of 1864. The period between the formation of the Great Coalition and the 
Quebec Conference in Quebec 1864 witnessed an increase in the Canadian government’s bor-
rowing costs: between June 1864 and October 1864, the yield spread between Canadian bonds 
and Consols widened from 2.4 percent to a peak of 3.3 percent on 18 October. Thereafter, the 
yield spread narrowed, falling to 2.8 percent in early November. It is reasonable to infer that 
the uncertainty created by the initial stages of the negotiations raised Canada’s borrowing 
costs. Once the market learned that the Quebec Conference was underway, it became more 
confident that a broad colonial federation would be the outcome. The yield spread hovered 
around 2.8 percent until January 1865, when it became apparent in London that Leonard 
Tilley’s pro-Confederation Government in New Brunswick was about to lose power. After the 
defeat of Tilley’s pro-Confederation government, the spread did not fall below 3.0 percent for 
the rest of 1865. The securities of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia exhibited a broadly similar 
pattern.
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Bischoff identified Baring and Glyn as two individuals with a particular interest 
in the proposed constitution.29
Although Bischoff found much to like in the Quebec Resolutions, he was 
disturbed that the doctrine of representation by population had been accepted 
by the Quebec Conference and told Galt that the allocation of seats should take 
wealth as well as brute numbers into account. Bischoff also expressed concerns 
about the federal nature of the proposed constitution, an issue he had discussed 
with Edward Cardwell a few weeks earlier.30 Bischoff conceded that the imme-
diate introduction of a unitary state was impossible, but thought that more could 
have been done to curtail the authority of the future provincial legislatures. He 
told Galt, “I consider that you have accomplished wonders, but having accom-
plished so much, I would hope you may still go a little further.”
Bischoff explained that “to create a Kingdom, the Local Legislatures must 
be reduced to the position of Municipalities. You have made great progress 
towards this but in carrying out details pray let this be your aim.” Bischoff 
objected to provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights on the grounds 
it would prevent the central legislature from unifying the commercial laws of 
the provinces. He reminded Galt that the existence of a separate legal system 
in Scotland created complications for British merchants every day.31 He also 
believed that the resolution giving the provinces jurisdiction over “loans of 
money on the credit of the Province” was dangerously imprecise, arguing that 
the provincial credit must be subordinate to the federal one, just as the credit of 
English counties was subordinated to the national debt of Britain.32
Judging from how the British business press reacted to word that a British 
North American federation was being planned, Bischoff’s preference for a rela-
tively centralized federation appears to have been widespread within London’s 
business community. Although support for this concept came from several 
publications, it is telling that the first British business newspaper to discuss the 
Great Coalition’s federation proposal was Herapath’s Railway and Commercial 
 29 LAC, Galt Fonds, Bischoff to Galt, 24 November 1864. Bischoff’s letters to Galt are important 
because they are the only surviving correspondence between a British investor and a Father of 
Confederation in which the constitutional plan outlined in the Quebec Resolutions is discussed 
in detail.
 30 Ibid., Bischoff to Galt, 3 November 1864.
 31 Bischoff’s concerns in this regard were shared by both Colonial Secretary Edward Cardwell 
and his Conservative replacement, Lord Carnarvon. In early 1867, Carnarvon and Cardwell 
unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the francophone delegates in London to cede Ottawa 
jurisdiction over aspects of “property and civil rights.” United Kingdom National Archives 
Kew, Carnarvon Papers, 30/6/154, “Letters to and from Lord Monck, Captain-General and 
Governor of Canada,” Monck to Carnarvon, 13 January 1867; Ibid., Rogers to Carnarvon, 18 
January 1867; also cited in G.P.Browne, ed., Documents on the Confederation of British North 
America (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), 230.
 32 LAC, Galt Fonds, Bischoff to Galt, 24 November 1864.
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Journal, the leading trade journal for the railway sector. In July 1864, it 
announced that under the proposed constitution, the provinces would have 
control over only “purely local matters.” The federal government, in contrast, 
would have complete authority over canals, railways, the public debt, and the 
ocean mail service. The editor of Herapath’s believed that British North America 
needed a robust central state and the benefits of Confederation were a theme to 
which the paper returned in late 1864. It is important to note that Herapath’s was 
consistently supportive of Confederation, even in the period before the publica-
tion of the Quebec Resolutions had clarified the precise details of the scheme.33
Although Herapath’s was confident that British North America was 
about to get the strong central government it needed, other British observers 
feared that the provincial governments would retain too much power under 
the proposed constitution. To understand their concerns, we should remember 
that the coalition government formed in the Province of Canada in June 1864 
to pursue Confederation included politicians, most notably George Brown, 
who envisioned a genuinely federal state. Brown and his allies supported 
Confederation as a form of decentralization and as a way of escaping from the 
“French Domination,” high taxes, and big deficits the 1841 Union had brought 
in its wake.34 The Economist newspaper was initially very sceptical about the 
projected federal union of British North American because it feared that the 
provincial governments would be accorded too much authority. In August 1864, 
during the interval between the formation of the coalition and the Charlottetown 
Conference, the newspaper had criticized George Brown’s federation proposal 
on the grounds that it would lead to an excessively decentralized government 
and a weakened state at a time when an “Absolute Parliament” was required 
in the North American colonies. As late as October, leading articles and other 
unsigned pieces in the paper were predicting that a spineless, decentralized 
federation would emerge from the constitutional convention then meeting at 
Quebec. The paper expressed doubt that the delegates would have the fortitude 
to propose the creation of the sort of dominant central authority that it thought 
British North America needed.35
 33 “The Canadian Confederation,” Herapath’s (16 July 1864), 831. Herapath’s was Britain’s 
leading trade journal for the railway sector. The benefits of Confederation were a topic to 
which the paper returned in subsequent months: “The Intercolonial Railway,” (5 November 
1864), 1276; “Trust and Loan Company of Upper Canada,” (3 December 1864, 1363-4).
 34 For Brown’s ideas on this point, see Globe (25 November 1864); Elwood Hugh Jones, “The 
Great Reform Convention of 1859” (Ph.D. diss., Queen’s University, 1971); Romney, Getting
it Wrong, 87-108.
 35 Economist, “The New Programme of the Canadian Ministry” (16 July 1864), 892-3; “Difficulties 
in the Way of the New Federation of Canada” (27 August 1864), 1080-1; “The Progress of the 
Scheme for the Federation of Canada” (15 October 1864), 1279-1280; “The Text of the Federal 
Constitution for the American Colonies” (26 November 1864), 1455-6. The Economist was 
edited by Walter Bagehot, who also wrote extensively on constitutional and financial topics.
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The Economist’s fears that a decentralized federation would be estab-
lished were probably inspired by George Brown’s prominent role in the Great 
Coalition. A related issue was the Toronto Globe’s long track record of attack-
ing the bankers of London for their alleged interference in Canadian politics. 
Indeed, the newspaper’s campaign against the bankers was so virulent that 
when Brown met Baring and Glyn in person during an 1863 visit to London, 
he was surprised to find they were actually quite “civil” to him despite years 
of criticism.36 In the early 1860s, Brown had advocated ending the province’s 
dependence on external sources of capital so that Canadian politicians would 
no longer have to “tremble at the frown of a Lombard Street banker.”37 By 
“Lombard Street,” Brown was referring to London high finance, the expression 
being similar to the modern Canadian metonym “Bay Street.” Brown’s lead-
ing role in the Confederation movement doubtless rang alarm bells for British 
investors in the Grand Trunk, for the subsidies that the railway had received 
from the administrations led by Cartier and Macdonald were Brown’s bête
noire.38
The arrival of the Quebec Resolutions in London in 1864 radically altered 
the attitude of the Economist and there was a palpable sense of relief in the arti-
cle on Confederation that appeared on 26 November 1864. This piece reassured 
readers that the authors of the union scheme did not envision independence and 
that they actually desired a quite centralized system of government with lim-
ited provincial powers. The Economist congratulated the colonial delegates for 
 36 J.M.S Careless, Brown of the Globe (Toronto: Macmillan, 1959-1963), 2:73-74. Brown’s 
campaign of banker-bashing dated back to the so-called Double-Shuffle episode of 1858. In 
that year, the liberal forces in the Canadian Assembly had formed an administration called the 
Brown-Dorion government. However, this ministry collapsed after a mere two days because of 
Governor Sir Edmund Head’s controversial refusal to grant a dissolution of parliament. Cartier 
and Macdonald promptly returned to power and Brown began to attack the corrupt influence 
on Canadian politics allegedly enjoyed by Thomas Baring and other London financiers, rep-
resenting Head as the instrument of Baring and Glyn. See “Sir E. Head’s Closet Councillors,” 
Globe (7 August 1858), 2.
 37 See “British North American Association,” Globe (29 September 1863), 2. In the early 1860s, 
George Brown had vigorously supported the efforts of Luther Holton, Sandfield Macdonald’s 
second finance minister, to end the Province’s dependence on the London capital market 
through a program of retrenchment, balanced budgets, and domestic borrowing. “Public 
Sentiment,” Globe (8 October 1863), 2. The Globe was particularly hostile to the BNAA and 
attacked the organization as a facade for the interests of the eight hundred or so Grand Trunk 
investors in Britain. “Grand Trunk Meeting,” Globe (23 August, 2) and “Intercolonial Railway- 
Increased Debt and More Taxes,” (2 October 1862), 2.
 38 Although Brown had a long history of attacking the Grand Trunk, it should be noted that it 
was a Grand Trunk manager, C.J. Brydges, who first approached Brown about participating 
in an “omnibus arrangement” that would solve many of the constitutional and infrastructure 
problems facing the colony. This overture helped prepare the ground for the formation of the 
Great Coalition in the Province of Canada and was another way in which British business was 
involved in Confederation. Careless, Brown of the Globe, 2:116-7.
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having moved in the right direction and thought that further progress could be 
achieved at their forthcoming talks with Edward Cardwell. The paper expected 
that Cardwell would insist on including clauses to increase the authority of the 
central parliament still further and hoped that the delegates would have the 
good sense to submit.39
Although seeing the Quebec Resolutions was enough to dispel the 
Economist’s fears, the spectre of excessive provincial power continued to 
trouble Frederic Algar, the editor of the Canadian News, a London publication 
which served British people with an interest in Canadian affairs. The Canadian
News, which reprinted articles from the colonial press, carried advertisements 
of interest to businessmen connected to British North America, and offered its 
own opinions on political matters. Algar, it should be noted, was a member of 
the BNAA. In the summer of 1864, the Canadian News lauded the proposed 
British North American federation and commended the colonists for their evi-
dent desire to remain part of the British Empire.40 However, the newspaper’s 
warm praise for the overall concept of Confederation was tempered with con-
cerns that a mere federation would prove too weak for the tasks at hand. The
News thought that something vaguely resembling a unitary state was needed 
in British North America. In the autumn and winter of 1864-1865, it printed 
many articles dealing with this theme. These ranged from a piece taken from 
the Halifax Citizen expressing a preference for a purely legislative union of the 
colonies to an article from the Montreal Gazette that re-assured readers that 
the proposed confederation would actually be very close to a unitary state.41
Federation and confederation were a loosely defined terms in the Victorian era, 
with both words embracing everything from loose confederacies to quasi-uni-
tary states; but the Canadian News clearly sympathized with those who sought 
a form of federation in which the central government had the lion’s share of 
power.42
The Canadian News appears to have associated political decentralization 
with excessive democracy. In October 1864, it printed a lengthy letter Thomas 
 39 “Text of the Federal Constitution for the American Colonies,” Economist (26 November 
1864), 1455-6.
 40 “The Proposed Confederation of the British North American Provinces,” Canadian News (4 
August 1864), 72-4.
 41 For the article from Halifax Citizen, see “Provincial Union,” Canadian News (20 October 
1864), 251. For the article from Montreal Gazette, see “The Question of Canadian 
Confederation,” Canadian News (13 October 1864), 226.
 42 The modern distinction between a loose confederation of states and a tighter federation is con-
tained in the entry for Federal Government in the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica. However, it 
had clearly not yet been developed at the time E. A. Freeman published his History of Federal 
Government from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States
(London: Macmillan, 1863).
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D’Arcy McGee had sent under the pseudonym “A Backwoodsman.”43 In this 
letter, McGee connected monarchical institutions with the existence of an active 
central government. Reversing Dunning’s famous eighteenth-century resolu-
tion on the dangerous growth of the power of the Crown at the expense of the 
Commons, he argued that nowadays the major danger came from having a weak 
monarch and an overly powerful electorate.44 The paper also serialized a lengthy 
diatribe by a Lancashire vicar convinced that the provincial legislatures would 
have too much power under the new constitution and that in any event federa-
tions were inherently republican and democratic. The Rev. A.A. Bridgeman was 
convinced that the democratic element had become the main threat to the con-
stitutional balance in the North American colonies. He suggested the creation of 
a dominant central government and a colonial life peerage as means of restoring 
constitutional equilibrium. Bridgeman recognized that a unitary state in British 
North America was unfeasible in the short-term and suggested that the constitu-
tion be structured so as to vest real power in the central government and thus 
reduce the provinces to a nominal political existence.45
Several factors contributed to the belief in Britain that British North America 
required a strong central government. The widespread view in Britain that State’s 
Rights and a weak central government, rather than slavery, were the true cause of 
the Civil War in the United States doubtless reinforced the British preference for 
a centralized state similar to that possessed by the United Kingdom itself.46 The 
City of London’s antipathy to powerful sub-national governments should also be 
understood in light of the practical problems many British businessmen had ear-
lier encountered as a result of the federal nature of the United States.47 Another 
factor prompting sympathy with the idea of vesting preponderant authority 
 43 McGee used the same pseudonym in publishing The Crown and the Confederation: Three 
Letters to the Hon. John Alexander McDonald, Attorney General for Upper Canada 
(Montreal: J. Lovell, 1864).
 44 “Backwoodsman” and “The Proposed Confederation- the Crown and the People,” Canadian
News (27 October 1864), 259. In 1780, a British MP named John Dunning had made a resolu-
tion condemning the growth of royal power at the expense of Parliament: “the power of the 
Crown had increased, was increasing, and ought to be diminished.” The context in which 
this resolution was made included the American Revolution and the struggle of the Whigs 
with royal authority. It would have been well-known to educated contemporaries, especially 
lawyers, and was discussed by Erskine May, Constitutional History of England since the 
Accession of George the Third (London: Longmans, Green, 1861), 1:51-61.
 45 “A.A.B. of Warrington” and “Why a Federation? Why Not a United Monarchy?” Canadian
News (15 September 1864), 168-70, continued (13 October 1864), 233-4; Rev. A.A. 
Bridgeman, “The British North American Confederation,” Canadian News (16 February 
1865), 108-9. 
 46 “Confederation of the North American Provinces,” Canadian News (20 October 1864), 250.
 47 For examples of the practical problems American federalism created for British investors and 
commercial travellers, see Leone Levi, International Commercial Law Being the Principles of 
Mercantile Law of the Following and Other Countries (London: V. and R. Stevens, 1863), 32.
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in the federal government was the poor treatment many British investors had 
received at the hands of certain American state governments, for while the 
United States federal government had acted with consistent probity with regard 
to British bondholders, Pennsylvania and several other States had defaulted on 
their sterling bonds in the 1840s.48
The preference many British people showed for a relatively centralized 
system of government in British North America was far from class-neutral. 
Indeed, given that a relatively large proportion of adult males could vote in 
Canada, it is not surprising that the intense class politics of 1860s Britain
informed investors’ views of the ideal distribution of powers under the new 
constitution.49 Contemporaries often linked small polities with excessive 
democracy and lower-class power. For instance, in 1860 Lord Mulgrave, the 
Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, had discerned a tendency for the legis-
latures of small jurisdictions to be filled with men who lacked private means 
rather than by wealthy gentlemen who legislated for larger countries.50 Sir 
Edmund Head had come to similar conclusions in 1856.51 While ostensibly 
based on his own experiences in New Brunswick, Head’s thinking may have 
been influenced by the British author C.B. Adderley, who had published a 
similar argument in 1853.52 In January 1865, the Canadian News compared the 
projected federation to the Westminster Review’s 1854 proposal for the conver-
sion of the United Kingdom into a federal state, a plan the Radical journal had 
favoured as providing for “the cheap and easy resort of all ranks to the local 
legislative centres.” The assumption on the part of the Canadian News that the 
governments of small territorial units would be more accessible to the masses 
(or “all ranks”) than the government of a larger jurisdictions helps to explain 
why it advocated a powerful central government.53
The preference for a relatively centralized type of federation reflected both 
the general attitudes of Britain’s propertied classes and several specific ques-
tions of political economy that were facing British North America at this time. 
 48 The role of the Pennsylvania episode in re-orienting the firm of Baring Brothers away from 
United States securities and towards those of British North America is discussed in Ralph W. 
Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at 
Work, 1763-1861 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 310-30.
 49 Exact figures regarding the percentage of adult males with the right to vote would be difficult 
to calculate, but it is clear that proportion was much higher in the colonies than the mother 
country. The colonial franchise is discussed in Jeffrey McNairn, The Capacity to Judge: Public 
Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000), 130; John Garner, The Franchise and Politics in British North America, 
1755-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).
 50 LAC, CO, 217/266, Mulgrave to Newcastle, 1 March 1860.
 51 LAC, CO, 42/206, Head to Labouchere, 3 September 1856.
 52 Charles Bowyer Adderley, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s Administration (London:
R. Bentley, 1853), 1:34-5.
 53 “Confederation,” Canadian News (5 January 1865), 9-10.
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One of these questions was the rate of taxation in the colonies, which was low 
by British standards and which limited the capacity of colonial governments 
to subsidize British-owned railways. Fear of the socialistic mass electorate 
became a leitmotif of conservative thought at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but most mid-Victorian people assumed that popular class electors were 
more hostile to the State than their social superiors.54 Indeed, many observ-
ers thought that expanding the size of the electorate would inevitably lead to 
low levels of taxation and government activity. That mass electorates were 
anti-statist was the working assumption of the 3rd Earl Grey, the man who 
as Colonial Secretary between 1846 and 1852 had helped usher in colonial 
Responsible Government.55 In 1859, Grey published a book in which he argued 
that strengthening the democratic elements of the constitution at the expense 
of its aristrocratic and monarchical branches could, if taken too far, result in 
an excessively weakened State and extreme laissez-faire. Grey thought that 
while British governments before the 1832 Parliamentary Reform had been too 
prone to interfere with the market, the expansion of the franchise had created 
too many barriers to government activity. Grey argued that Britain was under-
serviced by government and that in the settlement colonies the situation was far 
worse, although not as bad as in the hyper-democratic United States.56 Colonial 
taxes in this era were regressive, so the link Grey drew between mass suffrage 
and anti-statism seems quite plausible.57
For British investors in Canada, the discussion of how political struc-
tures influenced economic policies was a severely practical issue rather than 
an academic exercise. This was especially true for those who had invested 
money in firms dependent on taxpayer handouts. Ideologies of social class had 
long informed investor attitudes towards the political economy of Canadian 
investments, and dislike of broad electorates was most clearly seen in investor 
reactions to the Grand Trunk’s financial problems. In May 1861, the London
 54 This anti-democratic, anti-socialist attitude is discussed in E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of 
Conservatism: the Politics, Economics, and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880-
1914 (London: Routledge, 1995). For mid-Victorian ideas regarding the relationship between 
the expansion of the franchise and the size of the state, see John Stuart Mill, Considerations
on Representative Government (London: Longmans, Green, 1861), Chapter 6, sec. 2; John 
Austin, A Plea for the Constitution, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1859); Eugenio F. Biagini,
Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860-1880 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 84-92; c.f. Herbert Spencer, “Parliamentary 
Reform: the Dangers and the Safeguards,” Westminster Review (April 1860): 486-507. Spencer’s 
views anticipated those of later conservatives but were atypical for the 1860s.
 55 Arthur Doughty, ed., The Elgin-Grey Papers, 1846-1852 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1937).
 56 Earl Grey, Parliamentary Government Considered with Reference to Reform, 2nd ed. (London: 
John Murray, 1864), 94-7, 160, 175, 352.
 57 Gladstone’s vague hope that Canada would emulate Sir Robert Peel’s income tax was not 
fulfilled until the First World War. See University of Nottingham Library, Newcastle Papers, 
NeC 11252/1, Gladstone to Newcastle, 14 December 1861.
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Bankers’ Magazine had attributed the unwillingness of Canadian politicians to 
grant the firm larger subsidies to the fact Canada was ruled by “the rabble.”58
When the City of Hamilton defaulted on its sterling bonds in 1862 rather than 
increase property taxes, the Canadian News attributed this evidently immoral 
action to the low franchise requirements in Canada.59
For investors in the Grand Trunk and other enterprises reliant on the 
taxpayer, the chief issue was whether the new constitutional arrangements 
would strengthen the ability of the colonial state to tax and spend. Not surpris-
ingly, the probable level of taxation in the future federation was discussed in 
the pages of the Canadian News in the months after the Quebec Conference. 
The Canadian News quoted speeches by Nova Scotia Confederates in which 
the anti-Confederate position that the union would lead to heavier taxes was 
frankly conceded and then countered with the argument that higher taxes, far 
from being an impediment to economic progress, were actually a source of 
national prosperity.60 Given that many contemporary writers linked democracy 
and manhood suffrage with under-taxation and a weak state, the internal coher-
ence of the Canadian News’ position begins to become apparent: Confederation 
was favoured because it would limit democracy by changing the territorial 
scale on which decisions were made and this in turn would make it possible for 
the state to undertake necessary interventions in the economy.61
 The conservative aspect of Confederation was what struck British 
observers on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Writing in 
the Edinburgh Review, Arthur Mills, a Conservative MP with close ties to 
the British investors in Canada, praised the Quebec Resolutions as a truly 
“Conservative” document. He lauded the delegates’ evident desire to preserve 
the political connection with Britain, the proposal for an unelected Senate, the 
centralized nature of the new federation, and a perceived tendency in Canada 
“towards raising the qualification of electors.” He observed that “amalgamation 
was the order of the day” in many spheres, citing recent company mergers, the 
growth of trade unionism, and the unification of European states.62
The Oxford don (and future resident of Canada) Goldwin Smith also agreed 
that the Quebec Resolutions were conservative, although for him this conser-
 58 “Grand Trunk Railway of Canada,” Bankers’ Magazine (May 1861), 345-8.
 59 See piece on Hamilton city debts in Canadian News (3 April 1862), 215. This argument about 
the low franchise requirements was repeated in the “City of Hamilton Bonds,” Money Market 
Review (27 December 1862), 556.
 60 See speeches by McCully and Archibald, “The Confederation of the North American 
Provinces,” Canadian News (12 January 1865), 26-9; speech by Lynch, “Union of the 
Colonies,” Canadian News (16 February 1865), 103-4.
 61 See sources in note 54.
 62 Arthur Mills, “The British North American Federation,” Edinburgh Review 121 (January 
1865): 181-99.
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vatism was an object of condemnation rather than praise. Writing to a friend in 
New York, he denounced Confederation as an attempt by the British aristocracy 
“to plant an offset” in North America, expressing the hope that the “Canadian 
monarchy” would go the way of the recently-toppled Mexican Empire.63 In a 
March 1865 article, Smith condemned the projected federation as too central-
ized and for its deplorable tendency to preserve the constitutional bond between 
Britain and the colonies. Smith said that in adopting the interventionist economic 
philosophy of Alexander Hamilton, the framers of the new Canadian constitu-
tion had forgotten that as civilization advances, the relative importance of State 
initiatives decrease. Interventionism was anathema to Smith, who declared that 
laissez-faire and a cheap and constrained central government marked the true path 
to economic progress.64 The proponents of Confederation, he argued, wished to 
return to the discredited mercantilist ideas of the eighteenth century.65
Smith’s dislike of the Confederation scheme was shared by John Bright, a 
Quaker industrialist who was a leading exponent of Manchester Liberalism and 
who had an almost post-millennial view of the benefits of Free Trade. Bright 
also thought that the City played too great a role in shaping imperial policy. 
In the March 1865 parliamentary debate on whether to build fortifications in 
Canada, he lashed out against the influence of “the moneyed interest.” Bright’s 
outburst came after Sir Minto Farquhar, an MP with personal financial interests 
in Canada, had argued in favour of spending money on Canadian fortifications 
on the grounds they would protect the £43 million British firms had invested 
in the colony. Shocked by such a blatant display of self-interest, Bright had 
launched into a passionate denunciation of the City’s influence over public 
policy, declaring that he had never known “the City to be right” on any issue 
and that “men who are deep in great monetary transactions …. are not able to 
take broad and dispassionate views of political questions of this nature.”66
In January 1865, Bright praised the inclusion of the principle of represen-
tation by population in the Quebec Resolutions, but for him this redeeming 
 63 Arnold Haultain, Goldwin Smith, his Life and Opinions (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1913), 
57-8.
 64 Because Goldwin Smith was a committed classical liberal, his hostility to Confederation lends 
credence to Gad Horowitz’s controversial argument that Sir John A. Macdonald subscribed to 
a (relatively) interventionist and collectivist Tory philosophy. Gad Horowtiz, “Conservatism, 
Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 
and Political Science 32 (1966): 143-71, 157. For a criticism of Horowitz’s thesis, see Janet 
Ajzenstat and Peter J. Smith, “The ‘Tory Touch’ Thesis: Bad History, Poor Political Science” 
in Mark Charlton and Paul Baker, eds., Crosscurrents, Contemporary Political Issues, 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: Nelson, 1998), 84-90.
 65 Goldwin Smith, “The Proposed Constitution for British North America,” Macmillan’s 
Magazine XI (March 1865): 407-12.
 66 Hansard, 3rd ser., 177 (1865): 1613-1633; Ibid., 1662-1665, Sir Minto Farquhar. Farquhar was 
a member of the BNAA and a director of the Canada Company.
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feature was outweighed by the other aspects of the scheme.67 In particular, 
he objected to imperial assistance to the Intercolonial Railway, Nova Scotia’s 
forced inclusion in the union, the overly-centralized nature of the new Canadian 
constitution, and the interventionist philosophy implicit in the Confederation 
project.68 Bright’s stance is a reminder that the bipartisan consensus in Britain 
in favour of Confederation only embraced the front benches of the first two 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservative, and bears out the truth of the remark 
of the Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Derby, who described Bright as the 
“real leader of the Opposition” to his government.69 Ideologically, there were 
few differences between the landed gentlemen who led the two major parties, 
but Bright’s middle-class radicalism was genuinely different and led him to 
oppose key aspects of the Confederation settlement.
For railway promoters and other businessmen who stood to benefit from 
a more interventionist policy in the British North American colonies, the 
conservative or “Tory” aspects of Confederation would have been attractive. 
Another factor that likely increased the credibility of Confederation in the 
eyes of British investors was the tendency of Anti-Confederates to represent 
the investors as sinister figures with undue political influence. The Canadian 
historian F.X. Garneau had (unfairly) attributed the 1841 union to the influence 
of “la maison Baring,” and this accusation was repeated with exquisite timing 
in the summer of 1864 in La Revue Canadienne.70 The rouge paper Le Pays
informed its readers that Confederation was designed to line the pockets of the 
Grand Trunk and had been urged on the government by General Manager C.J. 
Brydges, the “mauvais ange” of that firm. Le Pays thought that Confederation 
would lead to a mountain of debt and sky-rocketing taxation that would enrich 
a few bankers while impoverishing the general population. For Le Pays, the 
very fact that Herapath’s Railway and Commercial Journal had endorsed 
Confederation was iron-clad proof it was a bad idea.71
 67 “Messrs. Bright And Scholefield At Birmingham,” Times (19 January 1865), 9. This was an 
issue in Britain too, where proportional representation as determined by decennial census 
was only achieved in 1885. Andrew Jones, Politics of Reform, 1884 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), 196-202.
 68 Bright was an advocate of decentralization and in March 1859 he lectured the Commons on its 
benefits, urging that the principle be introduced into the administration of India. Hansard, 3rd 
ser., 152 (1859): 1359-1373. For Bright’s expression of sympathy for Joseph Howe’s cause in 
1867, see Hansard, 3rd ser., 185 (1867): 1181-1187.
 69 James E. Thorold Rogers, ed., Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by the Rt. Honourable 
John Bright, MP (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), viii.
 70 Review of Garneau’s Histoire du Canada: depuis sa découverte jusqu’à nos jours in Revue
canadienne, 1 (1864): 424; article on “La Revue Canadienne,” Montreal Witness, Commercial 
Review and Family Newspaper (10 September 1864), 2.
 71 “La Confédération et le Grand Tronc,” Le Pays (28 May 1866).
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The view that the Grand Trunk was a driving force behind the colonial 
union scheme was not confined to francophones. The Montreal Witness made 
similar accusations when it argued that Confederation would “put a couple of 
millions, more or less, into the pockets of London bankers and speculators” 
connected to the Grand Trunk, while simultaneously depositing “some five 
millions into the pockets of the same parties, for certain alleged proprietary 
rights of the Hudson’s Bay Company, of which that company can make no 
use.” In return for supporting this corrupt measure, the British government had 
promised to put “all our prominent men into governorships or at least into a sort 
of order of nobility.”72 In the debate in the Canadian Legislative Council on 
the Quebec Resolutions, Benjamin Seymour, an Upper Canadian life member, 
characterized the Grand Trunk as a venture “planned by English capital-
ists” at the expense of Canada’s taxpayers. Seymour condemned both it and 
Confederation as incompatible with “retrenchment and financial reform.”73
In 1865 and 1866, perhaps the greatest obstacles to Confederation were 
the attitudes of swing voters in New Brunswick. Even before the defeat of the 
pro-Confederation government of Leonard Tilley in the 1865 general elec-
tion, the Canadian News was monitoring the situation in the province closely. 
It attributed anti-Confederation sentiment to the fears of the urban “working 
classes” and confidently predicted that the “master mechanics and manufactur-
ers” of Saint John would be able to persuade their less enlightened employees 
of the advantages of colonial union. They would do so by explaining how the 
construction of a railway would bring them cheap food from Canada.74 The 
Canadian News’s optimism was only barely dented by the victory of an anti-
Confederation coalition in the February-March 1865 election, for it cheerfully 
reported in April 1865 that there had been “gratifying intelligence that the 
confederation of British North America is progressing in a most satisfactory 
manner,” and that “the check which was given by the New Brunswick elections 
is proving to be of much less importance than was at first supposed.”75
Writing from London to console Tilley on his defeat, Watkin stated that 
“every one here, especially in official circles, give [sic] you full credit for 
having made a gallant and patriotic fight for a great measure for the general 
advantage of the British Empire.” The non-official circles to which Watkin 
referred doubtless included the BNAA. Watkin informed Tilley that he had 
written to Howe “to say what a grievous mistake has been made in NB and how 
much securities will be damaged and the British heart cooled down by what 
has taken place.” He argued that, much more than the price of New Brunswick 
 72 “Confederation,” Montreal Witness (19 January 1867), 44.
 73 Confederation Debates, 15 February 1865, 199.
 74 “To the Working Men of New Brunswick,” Canadian News (23 March 1865), 187.
 75 “Confederation of the British North American Colonies,” Canadian News (27 April 1865), 
264-5.
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bonds was at stake: “upon the back of the great Confederation idea we might 
just now have carried in Parliament [rode] almost any assistance the Provinces 
might reasonably want for the Intercolonial, fortifications, etc.” However, “as 
matters now stand” these proposals “will be chilled” and “every shilling” of 
Imperial money would have to be fought for.76
The Grand Trunk’s role in the 1866 New Brunswick election has been a 
matter of historiographical controversy and given the paucity of hard evidence, 
we will probably never be able to ascertain the truth of the allegations that its 
money influenced the outcome of the campaign.77 What is clear is that the 
implications of Tilley’s success in the election were immediately recognized 
by London business figures. For instance, at the June 1866 Annual General 
Meeting of the Trust and Loan Company of Upper Canada, reference was made 
to the likelihood of imminent Confederation. This took place during a discus-
sion of the Canadian statute that limited the interest the company could charge 
to eight percent.78 When a shareholder asked what progress had been made in 
lobbying the Canadian government to modify its usury law, one of the directors, 
William Chapman, replied that “there was reason to expect that a modification of 
those laws would take place on the meeting of the Legislature, and that as soon 
as the Confederation came into operation they would be entirely abrogated.”79
Chapman was a member of the BNAA and his remarks reveal his expectation 
that Confederation would benefit his company and other suppliers of capital.
At first glance, it is hard to see why Canada’s union with the lower 
provinces would have made the legal environment in Upper Canada more hos-
pitable to lenders. After all, the usury laws of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
were even more stringent,80 and the assimilation of the various provincial laws 
towards a national compromise rate would have been unfavourable rather than 
 76 LAC, Tilley Fonds 17, Edward Watkin to Tilley, 30 March 1865.
 77 G.E. Wilson, “New Brunswick’s Entrance into Confederation,” Canadian Historical Review
8 (1928): 4-24. C.f. A.W. Currie, Grand Trunk Railway of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1957), 96.
 78 The impact of the usury laws of the North American colonies were discussed at the AGM of 
the Bank of British North America in June 1866. At this point, interest rates in London were 
higher than the maximum legal rate in the North American colonies: the usury laws made 
arbitrage in borrowing impossible. See “Bank of British North America,” Bankers’ Magazine
(July 1865), 846-8.
 79 “Commercial,” Canadian News (7 June 1866), 365. In 1865-1866, a bill was introduced into 
the Canadian legislature to lower the rate of interest non-bank institutions could charge from 
eight to six percent. See An Act to Amend the Act Respecting Interest (Ottawa: Hunter, Rose, 
1865).
 80 C.D. Archibald, a New Brunswick-born merchant in London, complained that the usury 
laws of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were more stringent than those of Canada. See 
LAC, Tilley Fonds 17, C.D. Archibald to Tilley, 3 March 1864. The different legal maxi-
mums persisted decades after Confederation: Frank Weir, The Law and Practice of Banking 
Corporations under Dominion Acts (Montreal: J. Lovell, 1888), 415-20.
22
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2006 REVUE DE LA SHC
beneficial to lenders in Upper Canada, however welcome it would have been to 
people who supplied capital in the east. Why then did Chapman, the director of 
a company operating only in Upper Canada, believe that Confederation would 
lead to “free trade in money”?
In the 1865 Confederation Debates in the Canadian legislature, several 
speakers objected to the allocation of jurisdiction over interest to the federal 
government on grounds related to issues of democracy and social class. J.B.E. 
Dorion, a rouge opponent of colonial union, stated that regardless of his per-
sonal opinion of the wisdom of laws limiting interest rates, if “nine-tenths” 
of the population of Lower Canada desired such laws, he, as a democrat, was 
obliged to vote for them. Dorion argued that a truly democratic constitution 
would give authority over this issue to the legislative body best able to reflect 
the popular will in each community, concluding that the decision to assign 
jurisdiction over usury to the central government was yet another illustration 
that the proposed union was not a “real Federal system.”81
John Sandfield Macdonald, a fierce opponent of the Quebec Resolutions, 
also declared his opposition “to what is called free-trade in money” in the 
Confederation Debates. Macdonald argued that “moneyed corporations,” such 
as “the Canada Loan and Credit Company” and the “Trust and Loan Company,” 
were harming the province by draining profits back to Britain. Something 
should be done to protect the farmers of the province from this menace, he said, 
and tough usury laws were the answer.82 Given that populist politicians such 
as Sandfield Macdonald were attempting to create animosity towards British 
money-lenders, one can well understand why the owners of capital would 
have approved of a constitutional arrangement that would vest control over 
interest and banking in the hands of a remote central government. Sandfield 
Macdonald’s tirade against the usurers and the Trust and Loan Company sug-
gests that the decision to give jurisdiction over “interest” with Ottawa rather 
than provinces was more than a technical point of constitutional detail. Indeed, 
the debate over the usury laws shows that British investors had a stake in 
Canadian political decisions that went well beyond railways, canals, and other 
projects with high visibility.
British investors welcomed Confederation because it promised to improve 
the business climate in the North American colonies. Many opponents of 
Confederation attacked the proposed federation as a scheme designed to line 
 81 Confederation Debates, 9 March 1865, 859.
 82 Ibid., 7 March 1865, 738. The eventual BNA Act gave the federal government jurisdiction over 
“interest,” sec. 91(19) and sec. 91(21). However, post-Confederation finance ministers failed 
in their efforts to pass national usury legislation due to local opposition. In the 1870 debate on 
whether to establish a uniform national usury law, participants mentioned that in Nova Scotia 
the legal maximum on most forms of interest was six percent. Canada, House of Commons, 
Debates, 1st Parliament, 3rd session, (1870), 6 April 1870, 906 et seq.
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the pockets of rich London bankers. In view of the host of other factors, linguis-
tic, sectarian, diplomatic, and military, involved, it would be foolish to assert 
that investment-related considerations were the only motivators driving British 
support for Confederation. However, we need to place capital, capitalism, and, 
above all, individual capitalists at the centre of our analysis of Confederation. 
Doing so illuminates both the relationship between Britain and its North 
American colonies as it existed in the 1860s and the subsequent political and 
economic history of the Dominion. Thinking about Confederation in politi-
cal economy terms is a useful exercise for non-historians as well, for careful 
consideration of how public decision-making is influenced by constitutional 
structures and territorial scale can provide insights into important issues of 
political economy and social justice. In fact, Canadians seeking to understand 
many contemporary issues of identity, sovereignty, and the culture of the politi-
cal economy would do well to reflect on the importance of foreign capital in 
their history.
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